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Abstract
We construct a two-message oblivious transfer (OT) protocol without setup that guarantees
statistical privacy for the sender even against malicious receivers. Receiver privacy is game
based and relies on the hardness of learning with errors (LWE). This flavor of OT has been
a central building block for minimizing the round complexity of witness indistinguishable and
zero knowledge proof systems, non-malleable commitment schemes and multi-party computation
protocols, as well as for achieving circuit privacy for homomorphic encryption in the malicious
setting. Prior to this work, all candidates in the literature from standard assumptions relied on
number theoretic assumptions and were thus insecure in the post-quantum setting. This work
provides the first (presumed) post-quantum secure candidate and thus allows to instantiate the
aforementioned applications in a post-quantum secure manner.
Technically, we rely on the transference principle: Either a lattice or its dual must have
short vectors. Short vectors, in turn, can be translated to information loss in encryption. Thus
encrypting one message with respect to the lattice and one with respect to its dual guarantees
that at least one of them will be statistically hidden.
1 Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT), introduced by Rabin [Rab81], is one of the most fundamental crypto-
graphic tasks. A sender (S) holds two values µ0, µ1 and a receiver (R) holds a bit β. The func-
tionality should allow the receiver to learn µβ and nothing else, the sender should learn nothing.
OT has been a fundamental building block for many cryptographic applications, in particular ones
related to secure multi-party computation (MPC), starting with [Yao86,GMW87].
A central measure for the complexity of a protocol or a proof system is its round complexity.
One could imagine a protocol implementing the OT functionality with only two messages: a first
message from the receiver to the sender, and a second message from the sender to the receiver.
Indeed, in the semi-honest setting, where parties are assumed to follow the protocol, this can
be achieved based on a variety of concrete cryptographic assumptions (Decisional Diffie-Hellman,
Quadratic Residuosity, Decisional Composite Residuosity, Learning with Errors, to name a few),
as well as based on generic assumptions such as trapdoor permutations, additively homomorphic
encryption and public key encryption with oblivious public key generation (e.g. [BM89,GKM+00]).
In the malicious setting, where an adversarial party might deviate from the designated protocol,
the ultimate simulation based security notion cannot be achieved in a two message protocol (without
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assuming setup such as a common random string or a random oracle) [GO94]. The standard security
notion in this setting, which originated from the works of Naor and Pinkas [NP01] and Aiello, Ishai
and Reingold [AIR01], and was further studied in [Kal05, HK12, BGI+17], provides a meaningful
relaxation of the standard (simulation-based) security notion. This definiton requires that the
receiver’s only message is computationally indistinguishable between the cases of β = 0 and β = 1
1, and that regardless of the receiver’s first message, the sender’s message statistically hides at
least one of µ0, µ1. Alternative equivalent formulations are simulation using a computationally
unbounded (or exponential time) simulator, or the existence of a computationally unbounded (or
exponential time) extractor, that can extract a β value from any receiver message.
With the aforementioned connection to secure MPC, it is not surprising that this notion of
malicious statistical sender-private OT (SSP-OT) found numerous applications. In particular in
recent years as the round complexity of MPC and related objects is taken to the necessary minimum.
Badrinarayanan et al. [BGI+17], Jain et al. [JKKR17] and Kalai et al. [KKS18] used it to construct
two-message witness indistinguishable proof systems, and even restricted forms of zero-knowledge
proof systems.
Badrinarayanan et al. [BGJ+17a] used similar techniques to present malicious MPC with min-
imal round complexity (4-rounds). In particular, their building blocks are SSP-OT and a 3-round
semi-malicious MPC protocol (a comparable result was achieved by Halevi et al. [HHPV17] using
different techniques, in particular requiring NIZK/ZAP). Khurana and Sahai [KS17] used SSP-OT
to construct two-message non-malleable commitment schemes (with respect to the commitment),
and Khurana [Khu17] used it (together with ZAPs) to achieve 3-round non-malleable commitments
from polynomial assumptions. Badrinarayanan et al. [BGJ+17b] relied on SSP-OT to construct
3-round concurrent MPC.
Ostrovsky, Paskin-Cherniavsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky [OPP14] used SSP-OT to show that
any fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE) can be converted to one that is statistically circuit
private even against maliciously generated public keys and ciphertexts.
Our Results and Applications. Prior to this work it was only known how to construct SSP-OT
from number theoretic assumptions such as DDH [NP01, AIR01], QR and DCR [HK12]. If setup
is allowed, specifically a common random string, then an LWE-based construction by Peikert,
Vaikuntanathan and Waters [PVW08] achieves strong simulation security (even in the UC model).
However, the aforementioned applications require a construction without setup and could therefore
not be instantiated in a post-quantum secure manner. In this work, we construct SSP-OT from
the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05], with polynomial noise-ratio, which translates
to the hardness of polynomially approximating short-vector problems (such as SIVP or GapSVP)
to within a polynomial factor. Currently, no polynomial time quantum algorithm is known for
these problems, and thus they serve as a major candidate for constructing post-quantum secure
cryptography.
Relying on our construction, it is possible for the first time, to instantiate the works of [BGI+17,
JKKR17, KKS18, KS17, BGJ+17b] from LWE, i.e. in a post-quantum secure manner, and obtain
proof systems with witness-indistinguishable or (limited) zero-knowledge properties, as well as non-
malleable commitment schemes and concurrent MPC protocols. It is also possible to construct a
round-optimal malicious MPC from LWE by applying the result of [BGJ+17a] using our SSP-OT
1Notice that it is impossible to achieve statistical indistinguishability in this setting, at least against non-uniform
malicious receivers.
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and the LWE-based 3-round semi-malicious MPC of Brakerski, Halevi and Polychroniadou [BHP17].
Lastly, our result allows to achieve malicious circuit private FHE from LWE by instantiating the
[OPP14] result with our LWE-based SSP-OT and relying on the numerous existing LWE-based FHE
schemes. We stress that none of these applications had prior post-quantum secure candidates.
1.1 Technical Overview
Our construction relies on some fundamental properties of lattices. For our purposes we will only
consider the so called q-ary lattices that can be described as follows. Given a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
for some modulus q and m ≥ n, we can define Λq(A) = {y ∈ Zm : y = sA (mod q)} which is
the lattice defined by the row-span of A, and Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zm : Ax = 0 (mod q)} which is the
lattice defined by the kernel of A. Note that both lattices have rank m over the integers, i.e. they
contain a set of m linearly independent vectors over the integers (but not modulo q), since they
contain q · Zm. There is a duality relation between these two lattices, both induced by the matrix
A, and this relation will be instrumental for our methods.
An important fact about lattices is that a good basis implies decoding. Specifically, if Λ⊥q (A)
contains m linearly independent vectors (over the integers) of length at most `, then it is possible
to decode vectors of the form sA + e (mod q), if ‖e‖ is sufficiently smaller than q/`. Namely, to
recover s, e. Such a short basis is sometimes called a trapdoor for A.2
Consider sampling s uniformly in Znq and e from a Gaussian s.t. ‖e‖ is slightly below the
decoding capability q/`. Then if Λ⊥q (A) indeed has an `-basis then s, e can be recovered from
sA + e (mod q). However, a critical observation for us is that this encoding becomes lossy if the
lattice Λq(A) contains a vector of norm  q/`. That is, in this case it is information theoretically
impossible to recover the original s. This is because the component of sA that is in the direction
of the short vector is masked by the noise e (which is Gaussian and thus has a component in every
direction). This property was also used by Goldreich and Goldwasser [GG98] to show that some
lattice problems are in coAM.
To utilize this structure for our purposes, we specify the OT receiver message to be a matrix A.
Then the OT sender generates sA + e (mod q) and encodes one of its inputs, say µ1 using entropy
from the vector s (e.g. using a randomness extractor). We get that this value is recoverable if A
has `-basis and information-theoretically hidden if Λq(A) has a short vector. If the receiver’s choice
bit is 1, all it needs to do is generate A that has an `-trapdoor, for which there are many well
known methods to generate such A’s that are statistically indistinguishable from uniform (starting
from [Ajt99] with numerous followups). In order to complete the OT functionality we need to
find a way to encode µ0 in a way that is lossy if Λq(A) has no short vector. This will guarantee
that regardless of the (possibly malicious) choice of matrix A, either µ0 or µ1 are information
theoretically hidden.
Let us examine the case where all vectors in Λq(A) are of length  t for some parameter t.
Then the duality relations expressed in Banaszczyk’s transference theorems [Ban93] guarantees that
Λ⊥q (A) has a basis of length q/t. In such case we can use the smoothing principle to conclude that
if x is a discrete Gaussian with parameter q/t then Ax (mod q) is statistically close to uniform.
We can thus instruct the sender to compute Ax + d (mod q) for some vector d, and encode µ1
using entropy extracted from d. This guarantees lossiness if Λq(A) has no short vectors as required.
2While the form sA+ e (mod q) bears resemblance to an instance of the LWE problem (to be discussed below),
the matrix A in our setting might be chosen by a malicious party and therefore cannot be assumed to be close to
uniform.
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Furthermore, it is possible to generate a pseudorandom A (under the LWE assumption) and specify
d such that d is recoverable (this A corresponds to the public key in Regev’s original encryption
scheme [Reg05]).
All that is left is to set the relation between `, t, q so as to make sure that if one mode of the
OT is decodable then the other is lossy. One may be suspicious whether there is a valid setting of
parameters, but in fact there is quite some slackness in the choice of parameters. We can start by
setting `, t to be some fixed polynomial in n that is sufficient to guarantee correct recovery in the
respective cases. This can be done regardless of the value of q. We will set the parameter q to ensure
that if µ1 is recoverable then µ0 is not, which is sufficient to guarantee statistical sender privacy
against malicious receiver. Specifically, if µ1 is recoverable then Λq(A) does not have vectors of
length q/(k`), where k is some polynomial in n (that does not depend on q), and thus Λ⊥q (A) has
a k` basis. We therefore require that q/t k`, or equivalently q  k`t, which guarantees that µ0
is not recoverable in this case. Since k, `, t are fixed polynomials in n, it is sufficient to choose q to
be a sufficiently larger polynomial than the product k`t to guarantee security. Receiver privacy is
guaranteed since A is either statistically indistinguishable from uniform if the choice bit β is 1, or
computationally indistinguishable from uniform if β = 0.
Disadvantages of the Basic Solution, and Our Actual Improved Scheme. The proposal
above can indeed be used to implement an SSP-OT. However, when actual parameters are assigned,
it becomes apparent that the argument about the lossiness of s given sA + e (mod q) when Λq(A)
has some short vector does not produce sufficient randomness to allow extraction. This can be
resolved by repetition (many s values with the same A). However, the lossiness argument for d
guarantees much more and in fact allows to extract random bits from d deterministically. The
consequence is an unnecessarily inefficient scheme. In particular, the information rate is inverse
polynomial in the security parameter of the scheme.
The scheme we actually introduce and analyze is therefore a balanced version of the above
outline, where we “pay” in weakening the lossiness in d in exchange for strengthening the lossiness
for s, which leads to a scheme with information rate Ω˜(1) (achieving constant information rate
while preserving statistical security remains an intriguing question). Towards this end, we introduce
refinements of known lattice tools that may be of independent interest.
The idea is to improve the lossiness in s by considering the case where Λq(A) has multiple short
vectors, instead of just one. Intuitively, this will introduce entropy into additional components of
s, thus increasing the lossiness. We formalize this by considering the Gaussian measure of Λq(A).
A high Gaussian measure translates (at least intuitively) to the existence of a multitude of short
vectors, formally it characterizes the potency of e to hide information about s. The formal argument
goes through the optimal Voronoi cell decoder, see Section 3 for formal statement and additional
details.
Of course the lossiness in s needs to be complemented by lossiness in d if the Gaussian measure
of Λq(A) is small, which translates to having few independent short vectors in Λq(A). We show
that in this case we can derive partial smoothing where for a Gaussian x, the value Ax (mod q)
is no longer uniform, but rather is uniform over some subspace modulo q. If the dimension of this
subspace is large enough, we can get lossiness for the vector d and complete the security proof.
Partial smoothing and implications are discussed in Section 4.
To apply these principles we need to slightly modify the definition of the vector d and the
matrix A in the case of β = 0. Now A will no longer correspond to the public key of the Regev
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scheme but rather, interestingly, to the public key of the batched scheme introduced in [PVW08]
(which is also concerned with constructing OT, but allowing setup). The complete construction
and analysis can be found in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Statistical Sender-Private Two-Message Oblivious Transfer
We now define the object of main interest in this work, namely SSP-OT. We only define the two-
message perfect-correctness variant since this is what we achieve in this work. A two-message
oblivious transfer protocol consists of a tuple ppt algorithms (OTR,OTS,OTD) with the following
syntax.
• OTR(1λ, β) takes the security parameter λ and a selection bit β and outputs a message ot1
and secret state st.
• OTS(1λ, (µ0, µ1), ot1) takes the security parameter λ, two inputs (µ0, µ1) ∈ {0, 1}len (where
len is a parameter of the scheme) and a message ot1. It outputs a message ot2.
• OTD(1λ, β, st, ot2) takes the security parameter, the bit β, secret state st and message ot2
and outputs µ′ ∈ {0, 1}len.
Correctness and security are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A tuple (OTR,OTS,OTD) is a SSP-OT scheme if the following hold.
• Correctness. For all λ, β, µ0, µ1, letting (ot1, st) = OTR(1λ, β), ot2 = OTS(1λ, (µ0, µ1), ot1),
µ′ = OTD(1λ, β, st, ot2), it holds that µ′ = µβ with probability 1.
• Receiver Privacy. Consider the distribution Dβ(λ) defined by running (ot1, st) = OTR(1λ, β)
and outputting ot1. Then D0,D1 are computationally indistinguishable.
• Statistical Sender Privacy. There exists an extractor OTExt (possibly computationally un-
bounded) s.t. for any sequence of messages ot1 = ot1(λ) and inputs (µ0, µ1) = (µ0(λ), µ1(λ)),
the distribution ensembles OTS(1λ, (µ0, µ1), ot1) and OTS(1
λ, (µβ′ , µβ′), ot1), where β
′ = OTExt(ot1),
are statistically indistinguishable.
2.2 Linear Algebra, Min-Entropy and Extractors
Random Matrices: The probability that a uniformly random matrix A
$← Zn×m2 (with m ≥ n)
has full rank is given by
Pr
A
[rank(A) < n] = 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− 2i−m) ≤
n−1∑
i=0
2i−m ≤ 2n−m,
where the first inequality follows from the union-bound.
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Average Conditional Min-Entropy Let X be a random-variable supported on a finite set X
and let Z be a (possibly correlated) random variable supported on a finite set Z. The average-
conditional min-entropy H˜∞(X|Z) of X given Z is defined as
H˜∞(X|Z) = − log
(
Ez
[
max
x∈X
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
])
.
We will use the following easy-to-establish fact about uniform distributions on binary vector-spaces:
If U,V ⊆ Zn2 are sub-vectorspaces of Zn2 , and if u $← U and v $← V, then it holds that
H˜∞(u|u + v) = dim(U ∩ V).
Extractors A function Ext : {0, 1}d × X → {0, 1}` is called a seeded strong average-case (k, )-
extractor, if it holds for all random variables X with support X and Z defined on some finite
support that if H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ k, then it holds that
(s,Ext(s, X), Z) ≈ (s, U, Z),
where s
$← {0, 1}d and U $← {0, 1}`. Such extractors can be constructed from universal hash
functions [DRS04, DORS08]. In fact, any extractor is an average-case extractor for slightly worse
parameters by the averaging principle3.
2.3 Lattices
We recall the standard facts about lattices. A lattice Λ ⊆ Rm is the set of all integer-linear
combinations of a set of linearly independent basis-vectors, i.e. for every lattice Λ there exists a
full-rank matrix B ∈ Rk×m such that Λ = Λ(B) = {z ·B | z ∈ Zk}. We call k the rank of Λ and
B a basis of Λ. More generally, for a set S ⊆ Λ we denote by Λ(S) the smallest sub-lattice of Λ
which contains S. Moreover, we will write rank(S) to denote rank((Λ(S)).
The dual-lattice Λ∗ = Λ∗(Λ) of a lattice Λ is defined by Λ∗(Λ) = {x ∈ Rn | ∀y ∈ Λ : 〈x,y〉 ∈
Z}. Note that it holds that (Λ∗)∗ = Λ. The determinant of a lattice Λ is defined by det Λ =√
det(B ·B>) where B is any basis of Λ. It holds that det Λ∗ = 1/ det Λ. If Λ = Λ(B) and the
norm of each row of B is at most `, then an argument using Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
establishes det B ≤ `k.
For a basis B ∈ Rk×m of Λ, we define the parallel-epiped of B by P(B) = {x · B | x ∈
[−1/2, 1/2)k}. In abuse of notation we write P(Λ) to denote P(B) for some canonic basis B of Λ
(such as e.g. a Hermite basis). For lattices Λ ⊆ Λ0, we will use P(Λ) ∩ Λ0 as a system of (unique)
representatives for the quotient group Λ0/Λ.
We say that a lattice is q-ary if (qZ)m ⊆ Λ ⊆ Zm. In particular, for every q-ary lattice Λ there
exists a matrix A ∈ Zk×mq such that Λ = Λq(A) = {y ∈ Zm | ∃x ∈ Zkq : y = x ·A( mod q)}. We
also define the lattice Λ⊥q (A) = {y ∈ Zmq | A · y = 0( mod q)}. It holds that (Λq(A))∗ = 1qΛ⊥q (A).
Gaussians The Gaussian function ρσ : Rm → R is defined by
ρσ(x) = e
−pi· ‖x‖2
σ2 .
3i.e. a simple application of Markov’s inequality
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For a lattice Λ ⊆ Rm and a parameter σ > 0, we define the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ,σ on Λ
as the distribution with probability-mass function Pr[x = x′] = ρσ(x′)/ρσ(Λ) for all x′ ∈ Λ. Let in
the following B = {x ∈ Rm | ‖x‖ ≤ 1} be the closed ball of radius 1 in Rm. A standard concentration
inequality for discrete gaussians on general lattices is provided by Banaszczyk’s Theorem.
Theorem 2.2 ( [Ban93]). For any lattice Λ ∈ Rm, parameter σ > 0 and u ≥ 1/√2pi it holds that
ρσ(Λ\uσ
√
mB) ≤ 2−cu·m · ρσ(Λ),
where cu = − log(
√
2pieu · e−piu2).
Setting Λ = Zm and u = 1 in Theorem 2.2 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Let σ > 0 and x
$← DZm,σ. Then it holds that ‖x‖ ≤ σ ·
√
m, except with probability
2−m.
Uniform Matrix Distributions with Decoding Trapdoor For our construction we will need
an efficiently samplable ensemble of matrices which is statistically close to uniform and is equipped
with an efficient bounded-distance-decoder. Such an ensemble was first constructed by Ajtai [Ajt99]
for q-ary lattices with prime q. We use a more efficient ensemble due to Micciancio and Peikert
[MP12] which works for arbitrary modulus.
Lemma 2.4 ( [MP12]). Let κ(n) = ω(
√
log(n)) be any function that grows faster than
√
log(n) and
τ be a sufficiently large constant. There exists a pair of algorithms (SampleWithTrapdoor,Decode)
such that if (A, td) ← SampleWithTrapdoor(q, n), then A is of size n × m with m = m(q, n) =
O(n · log(q)) and A is 2−nclose to uniform. For any s ∈ Zmq and η ∈ Zmq with ‖η‖ < q√m·κ(n) the
algorithm Decode on input td and s ·A + η will output s.
2.4 Learning with Errors
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was defined by Regev [Reg05]. In this work we exclusively
use the decisional version. The LWEn,m,q,χ problem, for n,m, q ∈ N and for a distribution χ
supported over Z is to distinguish between the distributions (A, sA + e (mod q)) and (A,u),
where A is uniform in Zn×mq , s is a uniform row vector in Znq , e is a uniform row vector drawn
from χm, and u is a uniform vector in Zmq . Often we consider the hardness of solving LWE for
any m = poly(n log q). This problem is denoted LWEn,q,χ. The matrix version of this problem
asks to distinguish (A,S · A + E) from (A,U), where S $← Zk×nq , E $← χk×m and U ← Zk×mq .
The hardness of the matrix version for any k = poly(n) can be established from LWEn,m,q,χ via a
routine hybrid-argument.
As shown in [Reg05, PRS17], the LWEn,q,χ problem with χ being the discrete Gaussian distri-
bution with parameter σ = αq ≥ 2√n (i.e. the distribution over Z where the probability of x is
proportional to e−pi(|x|/σ)2 , see more details below), is at least as hard as approximating the shortest
independent vector problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ = O˜(n/α) in worst case dimension n
lattices. This is proven using a quantum reduction. Classical reductions (to a slightly different
problem) exist as well [Pei09, BLP+13] but with somewhat worse parameters. The best known
(classical or quantum) algorithms for these problems run in time 2O˜(n/ log γ), and in particular they
are conjectured to be intractable for γ = poly(n).
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3 Lossy Modes for q-Ary Lattices
The following lemmata borrow techniques of the proofs of two lemmata by Chung et al. [CDLP13]
(Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4), but are not directly implied by these lemmata. In this section and
Section 4, it will be instructive to think of Λ0 as Zn, which will be the case in our application in
Section 5.
Lemma 3.1. Let Λ ⊆ Λ0 ⊆ Rm be full rank lattices and let T ⊆ Λ0 be a system of coset represen-
tatives of Λ0/Λ, i.e. we can write every x ∈ Λ0 as x = t + z for unique t ∈ T and z ∈ Λ. Then it
holds for any parameter σ > 0 that
ρσ(T )
ρσ(Λ0)
≤ 1
ρσ(Λ)
.
Proof. As the T + y cover Λ0 it holds that
ρσ(Λ0) =
∑
y∈Λ
1
2
(ρσ(T + y) + ρσ(T − y))
=
∑
y∈Λ
∑
t∈T
1
2
(ρσ(t + y) + ρσ(t− y))
=
∑
y∈Λ
∑
t∈T
ρσ(y) · ρσ(t) · 1
2
(e−2pi〈t,y〉/σ
2
+ e2pi〈t,y〉/σ
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥
∑
y∈Λ
ρσ(y)
∑
t∈T
ρσ(t)
= ρσ(Λ) · ρσ(T ),
where the first equality follows from the fact that
∑
y∈Λ ρσ(T + y) =
∑
y∈Λ ρσ(T − y) = ρσ(Λ0).
The claim follows immediately.
Lemma 3.2. Fix a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with m = O(n log(q)) and a parameter 0 < σ < q2√m . Let
s
$← Znq and e $← DZm,σ. Then it holds that H˜∞(s|sA + e mod q) ≥ − log
(
1
ρσ(Λq(A))
+ 2−m
)
.
Proof. Given arbitrary A and y, we would like to find an s∗ that maximizes the probability Pr[s =
s∗|y = sA + e]. By Bayes’ rule, it holds that
Pr[s = s∗|y = sA + e] = Pr[y = sA + e|s = s∗] · Pr[s = s
∗]
Pr[y = sA + e]
= Pr[e = y − s∗A] · Pr[s = s
∗]∑
s′ Pr[y = sA + e|s = s′] Pr[s = s′]
= Pr[e = y − s∗A] · q
−n∑
s′ Pr[e = y − s′A]q−n
=
Pr[e = y − s∗A]∑
s′ Pr[e = y − s′A]
.
As the denominator
∑
s′ Pr[e = y−s′A] is independent of s∗, it suffices to maximize the numerator
Pr[e = y − s∗A] with respect to s∗. As Pr[e = y − s∗A] = ρσ(y−s∗A)ρσ(Zm) is monotonically decreasing
in ‖y − s∗A‖, this probability is maximal for the s∗ that minimizes ‖y − s∗A‖.
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Let V ⊆ Zn be the discretized Voronoi-cell of Λq(A), that is V consists of all the points in Zm
that are (strictly) closer to 0 than to any other point in Λ and, for any point x ∈ Zm that is equi-
distant to several lattice-points z1, . . . , z` (where z1 = 0), assume that there is some tie-breaking
rule x 7→ i(x), such that x − zi(x) ∈ V , but for all j ∈ [`]\{i(x)} it holds that x − zj /∈ V . By
construction, V is a system of coset representatives of Zm/Λq(A).
Moreover, for the maximum-likelihood s∗ it holds that Pr[s = s∗|y = sA+e] = Pr[e mod q ∈ V ].
By Corollary 2.3 it holds that ‖e‖ ≤ σ · √m < q/2, except with probability 2−m. Moreover,
conditioned on ‖e‖ < q/2 the events e mod q ∈ V and e ∈ V are equivalent. We can therefore bound
Pr[e mod q ∈ V ] ≤ Pr[e ∈ V ] + 2−m. By Lemma 3.1 we obtain Pr[e ∈ V ] ≤ ρσ(V )ρσ(Zm) ≤ 1ρσ(Λq(A)) and
therefore Pr[e mod q ∈ V ] ≤ 1ρσ(Λq(A)) + 2−m
We conclude that maxs∗∈Znq Pr[s = s
∗|y = sA+e] = Pr[e mod q ∈ V ] ≤ 1ρσ(Λq(A)) + 2−m. Thus,
it holds that
H˜∞(s|sA + e) = − log(Ey
[
max
s∗
Pr
s,e
[s = s∗|y = sA + e]
]
)
= − log(Ey[Pr[e mod q ∈ V ]])
= − log(Pr[e mod q ∈ V ])
≥ − log
(
1
ρσ(Λq(A))
+ 2−m
)
4 Partial Smoothing
In this section we will state a variant of the smoothing lemma of Micciancio and Regev [MR07].
Consider a discrete gaussian DΛ0,σ on a lattice Λ0. As in the setting of the smoothing Lemma
of [MR07], we want to analyze what happens to the distribution of this Gaussian when we reduce
it modulo a sublattice Λ ⊆ Λ0. The new lemma states that if the mass of the Fourier-transform of
the probability-mass function of DΛ0,σ mod Λ is concentrated on short vectors of the dual lattice
Λ∗, then DΛ0,σ mod Λ will be uniform on a certain sublattice Λ1 with Λ0 ⊆ Λ1 ⊆ Λ.
Lemma 4.1. Let σ > 0 and let Λ ⊆ Λ0 ⊆ Rn be full-rank lattices where det(Λ0) = 1. Furthermore,
let γ > 0. Define Λ1 = {z ∈ Λ0 | ∀y ∈ Λ∗ ∩ γB : 〈y, z〉 ∈ Z}. Given that ρ1/σ(Λ∗\γB) ≤ , it holds
that
x mod Λ ≈ (x + u) mod Λ,
where x
$← DΛ0,σ and u $← P(Λ) ∩ Λ1.
Notice that for the case of Λ∗∩γB = {0} we recover the standard smoothing lemma of [MR07].
The proof of Lemma 4.1 uses standard Fourier-analytic techniques akin to [MR07] and is deferred
to Appendix A. We will make use of the following consequence of Lemma 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. Let q > 0 be an integer and let γ > 0. Let A ∈ Zm×nq and let σ > 0 and
 > 0 be such that ρq/σ(Λq(A)\γB) ≤ . Let D ∈ Zk×mq be a full-rank (and therefore minimal)
matrix with Λ⊥q (D) = {x ∈ Zm | ∀y ∈ Λq(A) ∩ γB : 〈x,y〉 = 0 (mod q)}. Let x $← DZm,σ and
u
$← Λ⊥q (D) mod q. Then it holds that
Ax mod q ≈ A · (x + u) mod q.
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Proof. Setting Λ0 = Zn, Λ = Λ⊥q (A) and γ′ = γ/q, it holds that Λ∗ = 1qΛq(A) and
 ≥ ρq/σ(Λq(A)\γB) = ρ1/σ
(
1
q
Λq(A)\γ
q
B
)
= ρ1/σ(Λ
∗\γ′B).
Therfore, we can set
Λ1 = {x ∈ Zm | ∀y ∈ Λ∗ ∩ γ′B : 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z}
= {x ∈ Zm | ∀y ∈ Λq(A) ∩ γB : 〈x,y〉 = 0( mod q)}
= Λ⊥q (D).
Now it holds by Lemma 4.1 as u
$← Λ⊥q (D) that x mod Λ⊥q (A) ≈ (x + u) mod Λ⊥q (A). Write
y1 = x mod Λ
⊥
q (A) as y1 = x + z1 mod q for a suitable z1 ∈ Λ⊥q (A). Likewise, we can write
y2 = x + u mod Λ
⊥
q (A) as y2 = x + u + z2 mod q for a suitable z2. Thus it holds that
Ax = A(x + z1) ≈ A(x + u + z2) = A(x + u) ( mod q).
We will also use the following lower bound on the gaussian measure of lattices that have many
short linearly independent vectors. The proof of Lemma 4.3 is technically similar to the proof of
the transference theorem in [Ban93].
Lemma 4.3. Let Λ ∈ Rm, σ > 0 and γ > 0 be such that Λ ∩ γB contains at least k linearly
independent vectors. Then it holds that ρσ(Λ) ≥ (σ/γ)k.
Proof. Let Λ′ ⊆ be the sublattice generated by the vectors in Λ ∩ γB. Let k be the dimension of
the span of Λ′. As Λ′ ⊆ Λ, it holds that ρσ(Λ) ≥ ρσ(Λ′). As Λ′ has a basis of length at most γ, we
we have that det(Λ′) ≤ γk and conclude det((Λ′)∗) = 1/det(Λ′) ≥ 1
γk
. By the Poisson-summation
formula, we get that
ρσ(Λ
′) = σk · det((Λ′)∗) · ρ1/σ((Λ′)∗)
≥ (σ/γ)k,
as ρ1/σ((Λ
′)∗) ≥ 1. Thus we conclude that ρσ(Λ) ≥ (σ/γ)k.
5 Our Oblivious Transfer Protocol
We are now ready to provide our statistically sender private oblivious transfer protocol. In the
following, let q, n, ` = poly(λ) and assume that q is of the form q = 2p for an odd p. Let
(SampleWithTrapdoor,Decode) be the pair of algorithms provided in Lemma 2.4 and let m = m(q, n)
be such that the matrices A generated by SampleWithTrapdoor(q, 2n) are elements of Z2n×m. Let
Ext0 : {0, 1}d×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}` and Ext1 : {0, 1}d×Z2nq → {0, 1}` be seeded extractors, both with
seed-length d and ` bits of output. Finally, let σ0, σ1 > 0 be parameters for discrete Gaussians and
χ be an LWE error-distribution.
The protocol OT = (OTR,OTS,OTD) is given as follows.
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• OTR(1λ, β ∈ {0, 1}):
– If β = 0, choose a matrix A1
$← Zn×mq , a matrix S ← Zn×nq , E $← χn×m. Set A2 ←
S ·A1 + E and A←
[
A1
A2
]
. Repeat this step until A mod 2 has full rank.
Output ot1 ← A and st← S.
– If β = 1, sample (A, td)
$← SampleWithTrapdoor(q, 2n). Repeat this step until A mod 2
has full rank. Output ot1 ← A and st← td.
• OTS(1λ, (µ0, µ1) ∈ ({0, 1}`)2, ot1 = A):
– Check if A mod 2 has full rank, if not output ⊥.
– Parse A =
[
A1
A2
]
. Sample and reject a discrete Gaussian x
$← DZm,σ0 until ‖x‖ < σ0
√
m.
Choose a uniformly random r ← {0, 1}n and choose a random seed s0 $← {0, 1}d
for the extractor Ext0. Compute y1 ← A1x and y2 ← A2x + q2 · r. Set c0 ←
(y1,y2, s0,Ext0(s0, r)⊕ µ0).
– Sample and reject η
$← DZm,σ1 until ‖η‖ < σ1
√
m. Choose a uniformly random t
$← Z2nq
and a seed s1
$← {0, 1}d for the extractor Ext1. Compute y ← t · A + η set c1 ←
(y, s1,Ext1(s1, t)⊕ µ1).
– Output ot2 ← (c0, c1).
• OTD(β, st, ot2 = (c0, c))
– If β = 0: Parse st = S and c0 = (y1,y2, s0, τ). Compute r
′ ← by2 − S · y1eq/2 and
output µ′0 ← Ext0(s0, r′)⊕ τ .
– If β = 1: Parse st = td and c1 = (y, s1, τ). Compute t
′ ← Decode(td,y) and output
µ′1 ← Ext1(s1, t′)⊕ τ .
We will first show correctness of our protocol.
Lemma 5.1 (Correctness). Assume that the distribution χ is a B-bounded. Provided that σ0 ≤
q
4B·m and σ1 ≤ qm·κ(n) (where κ(n) = ω(
√
log(n)) as in Lemma 2.4), the protocol OT is perfectly
correct.
Proof. First note that as m ≥ n · log(q), it holds for a uniformly random A $← Z2n×mq that A mod 2
has full rank, except with negligible probability 2n−m (as detailed in Section 2.2). Moreover for
x ← DZm,σ0 and η $← DZm,σ1 it holds by Corollary 2.3 that ‖x‖ < σ0
√
m and ‖η‖ < σ1
√
m,
except with negligible probability. Thus, rejection in OTR and OTS happens only with negligible
probability.
In the case of β = 0, it holds that
y2 − S · y1 = (SA1 + E)x + q
2
r− SA1x
= E · x + q
2
· r.
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By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality it holds for each row ei of E that |〈ei,x〉| ≤ ‖ei‖ · ‖x‖. As the
entries of ei are chosen according to χ, we can bound ‖ei‖ by ‖ei‖ ≤ B ·
√
m. As ‖x‖ < σ0 ·
√
m,
we have that
|〈ei,x〉| ≤ B · σ0 ·m < q
4
as σ0 ≤ q4B·m . We conclude that r′ = by2 − S · y1eq/2 is identical to the vector r used during
encryption. Consequently, it holds that µ′0 = Ext0(s0, r′)⊕ τ = Ext0(s0, r′)⊕ Ext0(s0, r)⊕ µ0 = µ0.
For the case of β = 1, as ‖η‖ < σ1
√
m ≤ q√
m·κ(n) it holds by Lemma 2.4 that Decode(td,y1)
outputs the correct t′ = t. We conclude that µ′1 = Ext1(s1, t′)⊕ τ = Ext1(s1, t′)⊕ Ext1(s1, t)⊕ µ =
µ1.
We now show that OT has computational receiver privacy under the decisional matrix LWE
assumption.
Lemma 5.2 (Computational Receiver Security). Given that the decisional LWEn,q,χ-assumption
holds, the protocol OT = (OTR,OTS,OTD) has receiver privacy.
Proof. Let (A, st0)← OTR(1λ, 0) and (A′, st1)← OTR(1λ, 1). Assume towards contradiction that
there exists a PPT-distinguisher D which distinguishes A and A′ with non-negligible advantage .
We can immediately use D to distinguish decisional matrix LWE. Decomposing A =
[
A1
A2
]
, it holds
that A1 is uniformly random and A2 = S ·A1 + E, i.e. (A1,A2) is a sample of the matrix LWE
distribution. On the other hand, due to the uniformity property of SampleWithTrapdoor (provided
in Lemma 2.4) it holds that A′ ≈s A∗ for a uniformly random A∗ $← Z2n×mq . Consequently
AdvLWE(D) = |Pr[D(A) = 1]− Pr[D(A∗) = 1]|
≥ |Pr[D(A) = 1]− Pr[D(A′) = 1]| − |Pr[D(A∗) = 1]− Pr[D(A′) = 1]|
≥ − negl,
which contradicts the hardness of decisional matrix LWE.
We will now show that OT is statistically sender-private.
Theorem 5.3 (Statistical Sender Security). Let q = 2p for an odd p. Given that σ0 ·σ1 ≥ 4
√
m · q,
σ1 <
q
2
√
m
and both Ext0 and Ext1 are strong average-case (n/2,negl)-extractors, then the above
scheme enjoys statistical sender security.
Proof. Fix a maliciously generated ot1-message ot1 = A. Let in the following γ :=
√
m · qσ0 .
Consider the following two cases.
1. ρq/σ0(Λq(A)) > 2
n/2+1 or rank(Λq(A) ∩ γB)) > n/2.
2. ρq/σ0(Λq(A)) ≤ 2n/2+2 and rank(Λq(A) ∩ γB) ≤ n/2.
First notices that the two cases are slightly overlapping, but for any choice of A one of the two
cases must be true.
The unbounded message extractor OTExt takes input A and decides if item 1 or item 2 holds.
If item 1 holds it outputs 0, otherwise 1. Note that rank(Λq(A)∩γB) can be computed exactly. On
the other hand, it is sufficient approximate ρq/σ0(Λq(A)) to a certain precision to determine which
case holds.
We will now show that in case 1 the sender-message µ1 is statistically hidden, whereas in case
2 the sender-message µ0 is statistically hidden.
12
Case 1. We will start with the (easier) first case. We will show that either statement implies
ρσ1(Λq(A)) ≥ 2n/2+1. If it holds that ρq/σ0(Λq(A)) > 2n/2+1, we can directly conclude that
ρσ1(Λq(A)) ≥ ρ4√m· q
σ0
(Λq(A)) ≥ ρ q
σ0
(Λq(A)) > 2
n/2+1.
If the second statement rank(Λq(A) ∩ γB)) > n/2 holds, Lemma 4.3 implies
ρσ1(Λq(A)) ≥ (σ1/γ)n/2+1 ≥ 2n+2 ≥ 2n/2+1,
as σ1 ≥ 4γ.
Now let c1 = (y, s1, τ), where y ← t · A + η. Note that we can switch to a hybrid in which
the distribution of η is DZm,σ1 instead of the truncated version while only incurring a negligible
statistical error.
As ρσ1(Λq(A)) ≥ 2n/2+1 and σ1 < q2√m , Lemma 3.2 implies that
H˜∞(t|y) ≥ − log(1/ρσ1(Λq(A)) + 2−m) ≥ − log(2−n/2−1 + 2−m) ≥ n/2
Thus, as Ext1 is a strong (n/2,negl)-extractor, we get that Ext1(s1, t) is statistically close to uniform
given y. Consequently, τ = Ext1(s1, t) ⊕ µ1 is statistically close to uniform given s1 and y, which
concludes the first case.
Case 2. We will now turn to the second case, i.e. it holds that ρq/σ0(Λq(A)) ≤ 2n/2+2 and
rank(Λq(A) ∩ γB)) ≤ n/2. Theorem 2.2 yields that
ρq/σ0(Λq(A)\γB) = ρq/σ0
(
Λq(A)\
√
m · q
σ0
B
)
≤ 2−C·m · ρq/σ0(Λq(A))
≤ 2−C·m · 2n/2+2 = 2n/2+2−C·m
where C > 0 is a constant. This expression is negligible as m ≥ n · log(q). Consequently, the
precondition ρq/σ0(Λq(A)\γB) ≤ negl of Corollary 4.2 is fulfilled.
Now let D ∈ Zk×mq be a full-rank matrix with Λ⊥q (D) = {z ∈ Zm | ∀v ∈ Λq(A) ∩ γB : 〈z,v〉 =
0( mod q)). Thus it holds that Λq(A)∩ γB ⊂ Λq(D) and there is no matrix with fewer than k rows
with this property. As rank(Λq(A) ∩ γB) ≤ n/2, it holds that k ≤ n/2.
Decompose the matrix A into A =
[
A1
A2
]
with A1 ∈ Zn×mq and A2 ∈ Zn×mq . Let c0 =
(y1,y2, s0, τ), where y1 = A1x and y2 = A2x +
q
2r with x
$← DZm,σ0 and r $← {0, 1}n. As
ρq/σ0(Λq(A)\γB) ≤ , Corollary 4.2 implies that
(y1,y2) = (A1x,A2x +
q
2
r) ≈ (A1(x + u),A2(x + u) + q
2
r) =: (y′1,y
′
2)
where u
$← Λ⊥q (D). We can therefore switch to a hybrid experiment in which we replace x with x+u
while only incurring negligible statistical distance. We will now show that H˜∞(r|y′1,y′2) ≥ n/2.
As q = 2p and p is odd, it holds by the Chinese remainder theorem that
y′1 ≡ (A1(x + u) mod 2,A1(x + u) mod p)
y′2 ≡ (A2(x + u) + r mod 2,A1(x + u) mod p)
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Note that u mod 2 and u mod p are independent. As the mod p part does not depend on
r, we only need to consider the mod 2 part. Let in the following variables with a hat denote
this variable is reduced modulo 2, e.g. xˆ = x mod 2. It holds that uˆ is chosen uniformly from
ker(Dˆ) = {w ∈ Zm2 | Dˆ · w = 0}. The dimension of ker(Dˆ) is at least m − k ≥ m − n/2. Let
Bˆ ∈ Zm×m2 be a basis of ker(Dˆ). As Aˆ has full rank and therefore rank(ker(Aˆ)) = m− 2n, it holds
that rank(Aˆ · Bˆ) ≥ 32n. Therefore Aˆ · uˆ is uniformly random in an 32n dimensional subspace. But
this means that (yˆ′1, yˆ′2) = (Aˆ1xˆ+Aˆ1uˆ, Aˆ2xˆ+Aˆ2uˆ+r) loses at least n/2 bits of information about
r (c.f. Section 2.2). Consequently, it holds that H˜∞(r|y′1,y′2) ≥ n/2. Therefore, as Ext0 is a strong
(n/2,negl)-extractor, we get that Ext0(s0, r) is statistically close to uniform given y
′
1,y
′
2. Finally,
τ = Ext0(s0, r)⊕µ0 is statistically close to uniform given s0 and y′1,y′2, which concludes the second
case.
5.1 Setting the Parameters
We will now show that the parameters of the scheme can be chosen such that correctness, statistical
sender privacy and computational receiver privacy hold.
• By Lemma 5.1, OT is correct if σ0 ≤ q4B·m and σ1 ≤ qm·κ(n) (where κ(n) = ω(
√
log(n))).
• By Theorem 5.3, OT is statistically sender private if σ0 · σ1 ≥ 4
√
m · q and σ1 < q2√m .
These requirements can be met if
q2
4κ(n)Bm2
≥ 4√m · q,
which is equivalent to
q ≥ 16κ(n) ·B ·m2.5. (1)
If χ is a discrete Gaussian on Z with parameter αq, i.e. χ = DZ,αq, then, given that αq ≥ η(Z) =
ω(
√
log(n)) it holds that χ is αq bounded, i.e. B ≤ αq (with overwhelming probability). This
means that
α ≤ 1
16 · κ(n)m2.5 = O˜(n
−2.5)
implies inequality (1). Thus, we get a worst-case approximation factor O˜(n/α) = O˜(n3.5) for SIVP
(compared to O˜(n1.5) for primal Regev encryption). With this choice of α, we can choose q = O˜(n3),
σ0 = O˜(n
2.5) and σ1 = O˜(n).
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A Appendix
In this Section we will provide the proof for Lemma 4.1. We will first provide some additional
preliminaries.
A.1 Additional Preliminaries
Fourier Transforms We now recall a few basic facts about Fourier-transforms on lattices. Let
f : Rm → C and Λ be a lattice, if it exists, we will write f(Λ) := ∑x∈Λ f(x). For a nice
enough4 function f : Rm → C, we define the continuous Fourier-transform fˆ : Rm → C by fˆ(ω) =∫
x∈Rm f(x) · e−2pii·〈ω,x〉dx. The Poisson summation formula states that f(Λ) = det(Λ∗) · fˆ(Λ∗).
The Fourier-transform of the Gaussian function ρσ(x) is σ
m · ρ1/σ(ω). Consequently, we get by the
Poisson summation formula that
ρσ(Λ) = σ
m · det(Λ∗) · ρ1/σ(Λ∗).
Fix a full-rank lattice Λ0 ⊆ Rm and assume henceforth that Λ ⊆ Λ0. We say a function
f : Λ0 → C is Λ-periodic if it holds for all x ∈ Λ0 and all z ∈ Λ that f(x + z) = f(x). Now let
f : Λ0 → C be a Λ-periodic function. We define the discrete Fourier transform fˆ : Λ∗ → C of f by
fˆ(ω) =
∑
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
f(x) · e−2pii〈x,ω〉.
Here, P(Λ) ∩ Λ0 can be replaced by any system of representatives for the quotient group Λ0/Λ.
Using Fourier-inversion, we can express f as
f(x) =
det Λ0
det Λ
·
∑
ω∈P(Λ∗0)∩Λ∗
fˆ(ω) · e2pii〈ω,x〉.
Note that fˆ is Λ∗0 periodic.
Let x and y be random variables defined on Λ0/Λ. Let the probability-mass function of the
distribution of x be given by a Λ-periodic function X : Λ0 → R, and let the probability-mass
function of y be given by a Λ-periodic function Y : Λ0 → R. Finally, let Z : Λ0 → R be the
probability mass function of x + y. The convolution theorem states that it holds that
Zˆ(ω) = Xˆ(ω) · Yˆ (ω),
4where nice enough means that
∫
x∈Rm |f(x)|dx is finite
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for all ω ∈ Λ∗.
If x is distributed according to a discrete Gaussian DΛ0,σ and Λ ⊆ Λ0, then x mod Λ has the
probability-mass function of a periodic gaussian given by
ψσ(x
′) = Pr[x = x′] =
1
ρσ(Λ0)
·
∑
z∈Λ
ρσ(x
′ + z)
and it holds that
ψ̂σ(ω) =
1
det(Λ∗0) · ρ1/σ(Λ∗0)
·
∑
ξ∈Λ∗0
ρ1/σ(ω + ξ)
for ω ∈ Λ∗.
We define the Dirac-function δ : Λ0 → R as δ(0) = 1 and δ(x) = 0 for x 6= 0. If Λ ⊆ Λ1 ⊂ Λ0
and u is distributed uniformly random on P(Λ) ∩ Λ1, then u has the probability-mass function
U(x) =
det Λ1
det Λ
∑
y∈Λ1
δ(x + y)
and the Fourier-transform
Uˆ(ω) =
∑
ξ∈Λ∗1
δ(ω + ξ).
A.2 Proof of the Partial Smoothing Lemma
Lemma A.1. Let σ > 0 and let Λ ⊆ Λ0 ⊆ Rn be full-rank lattices where det(Λ0) = 1. Furthermore,
let γ > 0. Define Λ1 = {z ∈ Λ0 | ∀y ∈ Λ∗ ∩ γB : 〈y, z〉 ∈ Z}. Given that ρ1/σ(Λ∗\γB) ≤ , it holds
that
y mod Λ ≈ (y + u) mod Λ,
where y
$← DΛ0,σ and u $← P(Λ) ∩ Λ1.
Proof. First notice that Λ ⊆ Λ1 ⊆ Λ0 and Λ∗ ∩ γB ⊆ Λ∗1. The probability-mass function of y is
given by
Y (x) =
1
ρσ(Λ0)
∑
z∈Λ
ρσ(x + z)
for x ∈ P(Λ) ∩ Λ0. The Fourier-transform of Y is
Yˆ (ω) =
1
det(Λ∗0) · ρ1/σ(Λ∗0)
·
∑
ξ∈Λ∗0
ρ1/σ(ω + ξ) =
1
ρ1/σ(Λ
∗
0)
·
∑
ξ∈Λ∗0
ρ1/σ(ω + ξ)
for ω ∈ P(Λ∗0) ∩ Λ∗.
The probability-mass function of u is
U(x) =
det Λ1
det Λ
∑
y∈Λ1
δ(x + y)
for x ∈ P(Λ) ∩ Λ0.
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Note that U(x) is Λ-periodic as Λ ⊆ Λ1. We can therefore compute the Fourier-transform of U
and obtain
Uˆ(ω) =
∑
ξ∈Λ∗1
δ(ω + ξ),
i.e. Uˆ(ω) is constant 1 on P(Λ∗0) ∩ Λ>1 and 0 everywhere else.
By the convolution theorem, the Fourier-transform of the probability mass function of r =
y + u mod Λ is
R(ω) = Yˆ (ω) · Uˆ(ω)
for ω ∈ P(Λ∗0) ∩ Λ∗.
Consequently, we can bound the statistical distance between y and r by
2 ·∆(y, r) =
∑
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
|Y (x)−R(x)|
≤ det Λ
det Λ0
· max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
|Y (x)−R(x)|
=
det Λ
det Λ0
· max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
∣∣∣∣∣∣det Λ0det Λ ·
∑
ω∈P(Λ∗0)∩Λ∗
Yˆ (ω)(1− Uˆ(ω))e2pii〈ω,x〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
|
∑
ω∈P(Λ∗0)∩Λ∗\Λ∗1
Yˆ (ω)e2pii〈ω,x〉|
= max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
|
∑
ω∈P(Λ∗0)∩Λ∗\Λ∗1
1
ρ1/σ(Λ
∗
0)
∑
ξ∈Λ∗0
ρ1/σ(ω + ξ)e
2pii〈ω,x〉|
≤ max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
|
∑
ω∈Λ∗\Λ∗1
ρ1/σ(ω)e
2pii〈ω,x〉|
≤ max
x∈P(Λ)∩Λ0
∑
ω∈Λ∗\Λ∗1
|ρ1/σ(ω)e2pii〈ω,x〉|
=
∑
ω∈Λ∗\Λ∗1
ρ1/σ(ω) = ρ1/σ(Λ
∗\Λ∗1) ≤ ρ1/σ(Λ∗\γB) ≤ 
The second inequality holds as 1ρ1/σ(Λ∗0)
≤ 1 and the third inequality is an application of the triangle
inequality.
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